التقرير الأسبوعي لمراكز الأبحاث الاميركية

 

 

 Although Michele Bachmann won it, her victory was overwhelmed by the entrance of Texas Governor Rick Perry into the Republican race. This week’s analysis looks at the unique character of the American presidential primary process, which is quite different than that of the general election and reflects the conflicting interests of several political factions.

 

 They note, “China and Russia stand at the pivot of US-Iranian competition with China leaning toward Iran, and Russia leaning, more gradually, to the West. As major world powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council, both nations are essential to either inhibiting or shielding Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions. Neither China nor Russia is fully committed to either competitor, and both are engaged in a complex balancing act: leveraging support to advance their own positions while at the same minimizing the diplomatic costs of double-dealing. To secure Chinese and Russian support, the US and Iran stress the value of their relationship and the costs of partnership with the other.

 

 An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) over the United States could end modern life in America overnight. Whether caused by an enemy attack (a nuclear device detonated above the atmosphere) or by a natural phenomenon (a geomagnetic storm), an EMP can cause entire regions of the country to lose electricity—permanently. Despite the EMP Commission’s recommendations in 2004 and 2008, hardly any progress has been made in protecting the country from an EMP attack and its catastrophic results. The U.S. must prepare to deal with an EMP—now. While the ability of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to inflict catastrophic damage on U.S. infrastructure has been a known fact for decades, insufficient efforts have been taken to mitigate the threat. A survey of congressional, federal, state, local, and international measures to deal with the threat reveals more complacency than action.

 

 They are, “convinced that the population—with all of its ethnic and social classes and their various political and economic aspirations—strongly support the monarch leading that process. But they do expect the process to be more serious and lead to concrete results, rather than go through another experience where promises are left largely unfulfilled. The king seems well aware of the challenge, even as he recognizes that he must counter the many forces actively working against change and for the preservation of the status quo—forces that often come from within the political elite and traditional constituency of the regime.”

 

 They note, “There is a culture clash here, pitting the extreme autonomy of the volunteers against what seems to have been the top-down culture of the Qaddafi army, and it's not mediated by NCOs, who seem not to exist. I have never met a sergeant from the regular army in the other volunteer brigades, only officers ranking major and above. From the briefing, it is uncertain whether the general knows where Qaddafi's forces are in Sabratha, or where the other forces that are supposed to be converging from different sides are to join up. There is also an issue of numbers. Contrary to the Clausewitzian principle of concentration of forces, the revolutionaries seem to practice maximum dispersal. Some of the rest of the Zwara fighters are already an hour's drive down in Jalat, southwest of Surman in the parched Jafara Valley, close to the rapidly advancing front line. About twenty others are part of a larger force that recaptured Gharian. And some remain at one of two well organized and fairly comfortable camps at schools in Jadu.”

 

 Speaking of its potential to produce a nuclear weapon in months, the paper notes, “Though Iran could produce the HEU required for a nuclear weapon in just two months that does not mean it will do so in the next two months.  More likely, Iran will spend the next few years improving its position, by further shortening the time it will take it to move the last distance to a nuclear weapons capability.  Iran will most likely continue to expand its centrifuge enrichment capacity and enlarge its stockpiles of 3.5% and 19.7% enriched uranium.  At the same time, it could complete the production of the non-nuclear weapon components.  By 2012 to 2015, this approach will allow Iran to become a de facto nuclear weapon state without ever violating its IAEA safeguards or detonating a nuclear weapon.  Iran also has the option of building a clandestine centrifuge enrichment plant that produces HEU from natural uranium.  Iran’s noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards requirements means that such a clandestine plant could already be under construction or in operation.  By analogy with Pakistan, there are two key reasons to be seriously concerned about Iran gaining a nuclear weapons capability.  First, Iran could either voluntarily or involuntarily lose control of one or more nuclear weapons, allowing them to be delivered covertly against targets such as Tel Aviv or New York.  Second, Iran could feel that its nuclear weapons capability may protect it from major reprisals and therefore it might carry out various destabilizing attacks in the region on countries such as Bahrain or even Saudi Arabia. 

 

 They conclude, “Some regime elements may be concerned about the effects of violence on external opinion and unit loyalty, with such sentiments possibly reining in the most extravagant forms of violence, such as airstrikes and artillery fire. But effectively, the regime has few limits on its ability to kill people. For the United States and other countries, the regime's murderous behavior should add to existing pressure to act quickly and strongly to stop the bloodshed. “

 

 Despite objections from the international community, as well as Turkey's stern warning that Syria should end its five-month crackdown on protesters, Syria's President Bashar al-Assad continues to press on with brutal attacks around the country. What's needed to stop Assad is concerted international pressure, which is what the Obama administration is pushing for, says Syria expert Andrew J. Tabler. He says that at this point, any gestures Assad makes toward reform are no longer credible, and the international community should invoke tough sanctions against Syria's oil exports, 96 percent of which are purchased Europe. He also notes that the Saudis, in particular, are concerned about the potential for Iran to increase its backing of Assad against the opposition.