التقرير الأسبوعي لمراكز الأبحاث الاميركية

تاريخ الإضافة الثلاثاء 24 أيار 2011 - 6:59 ص    عدد الزيارات 1049    التعليقات 0

        

مركز الدراسات الأميركية والعربية - المرصد الفكري / البحثي

 

التقرير الأسبوعي لمراكز الأبحاث الاميركية

 

A Bi-Lingual Report of U.S. Think Tank Community

 

May 20, 2011

 


Executive Summary

 

This is a major week in the course of American/Middle East relations with Obama delivering key Middle East speeches and holding meetings with Jordanian King Abdullah and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington this week.  Most of the think tank community looks at these events from different perspectives.

 

An early analysis of the speech indicates that little has changed.  Obama offered more foreign aid to countries in the region, especially Egypt; promised to push for a Palestinian/Israeli peace deal, but specifics were scarce; and took aim at Syria calling for Bachar Assad to lead the reform or face isolation but stopping short of calling for regime change.


 

المقدمة:

         تم الاعداد بعناية فائقة ليكون هذا الاسبوع مشبعا بقضايا الشرق الاوسط، اذ اشيع منذ زمن عن نية الرئيس باراك اوباما بالقاء خطاب يتناول فيه الاوضاع في المنطقة العربية خصيصا. كما تم تسخير الرأي العام واشغاله بلقاءات اوباما مع العاهل الاردني ومن بعده مع بنيامين نتنياهو. وكانت تلك المواضيع من ضمن اهم ما تناولته مراكز الفكر والابحاث الاميركية.

 

         وبالتحليل الاولي لخطاب اوباما نجد انه لم يأت على اي جديد او مثير، وجاء ليتحدث بدوافع سياسية داخلية وخارجية. اذ لم يفلح اوباما في صياغة دقيقة لمتطلبات الاستراتيجية الاميركية شاملة ومتناسقة الاهداف سياسيا وايديولوجيا، كما كان متوقعا. وعوضا عن ذلك، فضل استعراض عدة قضايا دون روابط فعلية، كلوحة فنية مليئة برموز غير مفهومة. وحرص من خلاله على ارسال رسالة واحدة الى المسلمين والمسيحيين واليهود، على السواء، بأن مكانة الولايات المتحدة الكونية في ظل زعامة اوباما هي الخيار الافضل الذي يعول عليه من قبل كل الاطراف. اي، عليهم رؤية ديناميكيات الواقع من خلال منظار اوباما او ما يسمح به بشكل ادق.

 

         وعلى المستوى الداخلي، كان الهاجس الانتخابي على سلم اولويات اوباما مصحوبا بالازمة الاقتصادية الراهنة. وحاول اقناع الرأي العام الاميركي بقدرته على ادارة دفة قيادة البلاد والمحافظة على مكانتها العالمية؛ وايضا سعى الى ترسيخ مفاهيم وقناعات ايجابية عن الولايات المتحدة كقوة تتصرف بمسؤولية عالية وتتحلى بالقيم النبيلة والمشاعر الانسانية. ورغم ان خطابه اتى بقدر كبير على مسألة الصراع العربي – الاسرائيلي ودور الولايات المتحدة المركزي في مسار التفاوض السلمي، الا انه لم يجرؤ تناول استقالة مبعوثه الخاص لمحادثات السلام، جورج ميتشل، الذي اعلن عن استقالته قبل خطاب اوباما ببضعة ايام.

 

         وما تناوله للثورات العربية والتحولات الواعدة الا محاولة للالتفاف عليها واحتوائها وافراغها من مضمونها، وتعزيز نفوذ قوى الثورة المضادة التي وعد بتقديم كل اساليب الدعم لها. وارفق ذلك الجهد بـ"رشوة" مصر وتونس تحديدا عبر التلويح بمساعدات اقتصادية وتسهيل اجراءات الحصول على القروض وتحرير القيود التجارية بين الدول ، وهي ذات الاجراءات التي كبلت البلدين طيلة العقود الماضية، وهي تنتظر مساعدة اميركا على اعادة الاموال المسروقة منها بدل تلقي رشاوى اقتصادية.

 

وجاء خطابه مليء بالوعود في الشق الفلسطيني، داعيا طرفي الصراع التوصل الى صفقة دون تحديد بنودها وعناصرها؛ لكن لهجة الحزم والتصعيد في الخطاب كانت من نصيب سورية والرئيس بشار الاسد. وينبغي عدم الانجرار او الانخداع بتعابيره المنتقاة جيدا التي توحي بانتقاده لاسرائيل والتي اكد مرة اخرى على ان الولايات المتجدة تجدد التزامها بضمان أمن ومسقبل دولة الكيان الصهيوني.

 

          ومن بين المؤسسات الفاعلة والمؤثرة على قرارات الرئيس اوباما مركز التقدم الاميركي، Center for American progress وله دور لا يستهان به في تقديم الاقتراحات وتوصيات العمل فيما يتعلق بالسياسة الاميركية في الشرق الاوسط. وقال المركز "لكن تلوح فرصا كبيرة في سياق هذا التحول . لعل من اكبر الفرص التي اتاحتها الانتفاضات الشعبية هي تقديم العون للدول التي تشهد تحولات من الانظمة الاستبدادية التي سمحت للتهديدات الارهابية ان تنمو جنبا الى جنب مع مواطن الفقر، ووهن اسلوب الحكم، والفساد من اجل المضي نحو نظام اكثر ديموقراطية. فالاسلوب القديم المعتمد للتعامل مع قضايا الشرق الاوسط اضحى غير مجد. وعند هذا المفصل التاريخي والمحوري في الشرق الاوسط يتعين على ادارة الرئيس اوباما مضاعفة جهودها لدعم التحولات من خلال اعتماد حزمة اصصلاحات شاملة لمصر، واحياء الجهود المتعثرة للتوصل الى حل النزاع العربي – الاسرائيلي، والمحافظة على ذات الجهد فيما يتعلق بايران. ان التحرك قدما بجرأة– كما فعل اوباما باصدار قراره للهجوم على بن لادن – سيؤدي الى نتائج افضل للتقدم والتغيير في المنطقة."

 

         واهتمت مؤسسة هاريتاج Heritage Foundation اليمينية بالخطاب قبل القاءه، لتطرح بعض التوصيات في هذا الشأن. وقالت "ان أية استراتيجية اميركية جديدة يتم الاعلان عنها من قبل الرئيس تخلو من الالتزامات الصلبة هذه سيكون مصيرها اقل مما هو مطلوب. فالرئيس اوباما لا يستطيع الاتيان بخطة للانخراط الاميركي المستقبلي في الشرق الاوسط "الجديد" بناء على مسلك البيت الابيض خلال السنتين الماضيتين – ان تلك الجهود عادت بالقليل جدا كما وانها غير كافية لمواجهة الحقائق الاستراتيجحية الجديدة في المنطقة. اذ ان سياسة الادارة المتبعة حيال ديكتاتوريات معادية في ايران وسوريا قد باءت بالفشل، ويتعين على الادارة ان تتعاون مع الشعب عوضا عن مضطهديه. وعلى الولايات المتحدة ان تثبت مصداقيتها كحليف للقوى الديموقراطية وليس بوسعها تجاهلها لقاء جهود تبذل دون جدوى للتوصل الى ترتيبات ديبلوماسية مشكوك بها مع انظمة تزداد عزلتها، ايران وسوريا."

 

         وتناول مركز ويلسون Wilson Center الخطاب المقرر ليشير الى القضايا المعقدة التي تنتظر الولايات المتحدة التعامل معها. واقترح المركز انه "يتعين على اوباما النظر الى ما يمكنه الحصول به من نتنياهو في قضايا كبيرة كالحدود التي تنتظر لقاءه مع عباس. فالرهان الحقيقي هو المحافظة على عدم نشوب مواجهة في الفترة الراهنة؛ فهو بحاجة اليها لتحييد الازمة المقبلة في الخريف عند ذهاب الفلسطينيين الى الامم المتحدة للحصول على دعم مطلبهم بدولة افتراضية."

 

         اما اكبر المراكز الفكرية تأثيرا في القرار السياسي، معهد بروكينغز Brookings Institute يطرح عدة خيارات على الرئيس اوباما في المفاوضات العربية الاسرائيلية. ويقول "من السهل الاتيان بذرائع تفيد بأن الوقت الحالي غير مناسب، آخذين بعين الاعتبار السياسة الداخلية الاسرائيلية وصفقة حماس – فتح. لكن الحقيقة تفيد بان اية تسوية من شأنها ان تصمد تتطلب تنازلات ثنائية قاسية ولن يكون بوسع قيادة فلسطسنية منقسمة ان تروج لتلك الصفقة لجمهورها – وبالتأكيد ليس في ظل مناخ الانتفاضات الشعبية. والاسرائيليون يسعفون انفسهم بتكرار ما سبق واقدموا عليه في ظل اجواء الازمة: التوصل لصيغة حكومة وحدة وطنية خاصة بهم للتحضير لاجراء مفاوضات جادة. لكن واشنطن وحدها بامكانها تسلم القيادة وعلاقاتها مع عالم عربي ثائر يعتمد عليها."

 

         وجاء الاهتمام بسورية من جانب معهد وقف كارنيغي Carnegie Endowment ، اذ يقول ان "اسرائيل والولايات المتحدة، كطرف، لا يثقوا بمسقبل سورية. وليس لديهم ادنى تقارب مع الحكومة السورية، التي عارضت الاحتلال الاسرائيلي والسياسة الاميركية في المنطقة لعدة سنوات. لكنهما يخشيان ان تفضي الاوضاع الى تحول اسلامي في سورية ان انهار النظام الحالي. لكن الادارة الاميركية تتخذ موقفا اكثر شدة في ظل تزايد سفك الدماء. وبالمجمل، ليكن واضحا ان تعامل سورية مع الازمة كلف البلاد كثيرا لا سيما في خسارة الارواح والاصابات والاستقرار الداخلي والازدهار. كما ان تعاملها عاد عليها بالضرر لناحية علاقات سورية الاقليمية والدولية. ان افضل تصور كمخرج هو قبول الرئيس بالحاجة الى احداث اصلاحات حقيقية سريعا، والريادة في تطبيق عدد من هذه الاصلاحات المنصوص عليها في المبادرة الوطنية للتغيير. لكن هذا يبدو بعيد المنال. اما اسوأ خيار فهو الاستمرار في الدوامة الحالية هبوطا الى هاوية الحرب الاهلية. وما على المرء الا ان يتمنى ان تتوصل سورية الى صيغة للتغلب على حالة الجمود الخطيرة هذه."

 

         ولم يتخلف معهد واشنطن Washington Institute ، الصهيوني الانتماء، عن الادلاء بدلوه في موضوع سورية، وبخلاف نظيره معهد كارنيغي فقد طالب الرئيس الاسد بالتنحي. وقال "ان فيصل التغيير يكمن في وضوح الرسالة المرسلة لسورية. فالطاقم المحيط بالاسد، ضباط وقيادات الجيش، طبقة التجار السنيةو والمتظاهرين الشجعان عليهم جميعا ان يدركوا ان الخيار الافضل هو "على الاسد ان يرحل." والدعم الدولي لطرف يحدد خياره كـ "شيطان لا نعرفه" سيدعم تمكين السوريين لاحداث التغيير."

 

         وفي مسألة مختلفة، حذرت مؤسسة هاريتاج Heritage Foundation الساسة المعنيين من ممارسة اي ضغوطات للانسحاب من افغانستان بما ان بن لادن قد قضى. وقال "قد يؤشر مقتل بن لادن الى نقطة تحول في القتال ضد الارهاب. لكن استخدامه كذريعة لانسحاب سرييع للقوات من افغانستان يعبر عن قصر نظر وعلى الارجح سيؤدي للكوارث في المنطقة، التي تعاني من وفرة الجماعات الاسلامية المتطرفة التي تهدد الاستقرار في كل من افغانستان والمسلحة نوويا الباكستان. ان اي انسحاب اميركي تعسفي من افغانستان سيفتح الباب امام طالبان لتستعيد نفوذها في المنطقة والسماح للقاعدة والمنظمات المنضوية تحت لوائها لاعادة تنظيمها ونشاطاتها. وفي المقابل، يتعين على الولايات المتحدة المضي للاستفادة من ميزاتها في افغانستان والاثبات انها ملتزمة في تحقيق  استقرار طويل الامد في المنطقة."

 

 

التحليل: 

المرتزقة والشرق الاوسط

 

         بالرغم من الحروب المتعددة الدائرة في المنطقة، فقد حافظ الشرق الاوسط على خلوه من القوات المرتزقة تقريبا لحين بدء الغزو الاميركي للعراق، وذلك مع الاقرار بأن عددا من دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي اقدمت على توظيف تشكيلات كبيرة من الوحدات العسكرية الاجنبية وضمها الى قواتها المسلحة؛ كما ان القارة الافريقية جنوبي الصحراء عانت من تدخلات قوات المرتزقة لنحو نصف قرن. وقد جرت اشاعات عن قيام القذافي بتجنيد جنود متقاعدين من مناطق في غربي افريقيا في قتاله ضد المتمردين.

 

         لكن الجائزة الاكبر في هذا الشأن هي اعلان الامارات العربية المتحدة مؤخرا عن قيامها بالتعاقد مع طرف اميركي لانشاء كتيبة مقاتلين من المرتزقة، تتميز بالمهنية العالية والاجور العالية ايضا. وتعد الولايات المتحدة بأنها اكبر صاحب عمل لتوظيف المرتزقة عبر العالم في الحقبة الراهنة، اذ ان معظم عناصر المرتزقة هم من افراز القوات الخاصة الاميركية. وتقوم شركات خاصة بتوظيف "الخدمات الأمنية" التي يوفرها المرتزقة لحماية مصالح معينة تقع في مناطق بعيدة ولا تتعرض للمسائلة. وحتى الأمم المتحدة قامت بتوظيف شركة مرتزقة من جنوب افريقيا، اكزكيوتيف آوتكامز Executive Outcomes ، للقيام بمهام لوجستية ودعم في القارة الافريقية، لا سيما خلال عقد الستينيات من القرن المنصرم لصالح المنظمة الدولية.

 

         ان استخدام الامارات لقوات المرتزقة يرجح اضطلاعها بمهام بعيدة عن المهام التقليدية المعتادة، في ظل الاوضاع الراهنة، منها: توفير الأمن والحماية؛ مقاومة الارهاب؛ عمليات القوات الخاصة؛ وقمع الثورات الداخلية.  ان قبول الامارات "استضافة" المسؤول الاول عن اكبر شركة توظيف مرتزقة اميركي، أريك برنس، الذي فرّ من الولايات المتحدة ليقيم مركز نشاطه في الامارات يعد من غرائب الاستثمارات الاقتصادية، وهو لا يشكو من شح مجالات الاستثمار. اذ ليس من السهل تجاهل انتقال رؤوس الاموال المالية الى المركز المالي العالمي، وول ستريت، في ظل نظام العولمة الاميركي، الا ان هذه الخطوة تعد غير مسبوقة وتأتي خارج سياق الاستثمار المالي البحت، لا سيما وان برينس يعد من ضمن شريحة المليارديريين الاميركيين ولديه استثمارات ضخمة داخل بلاده، علاوة على انه يدعم المنظات اليمينية والعنصرية والمعادية لكل ما له علاقة بالاسلام والمسلمين. اذن، فلنبحث عن البعد السياسي للمسألة في ظل الاستراتيجية العسكرية الاميركية لمحميات الخليج التي تتسابق على توطين العسكرية الاميركية على اراضيها.

 

         وفي هذا السياق وحده يمكن الجزم بأن خطوة الامارات التي ترمي الى نيل الرضى الاميركي دوما، قررت "تأجير" اراضيها لتكون قاعدة لقوات المرتزقة، الذين يتحركون ضمن المخطط الاستراتيجي الاميركي ولخدمته تحت مسميات ملطفة كتقديم الحماية للشخصيات الهامة والمراكز الحيوية. وتجدر الاشارة الى ان مهام تلك القوات المرتزقة في العراق، والتابعة لأريك برنس، قامت بمهام قتالية ومداهمات واغتيالات واعتقالات نيابة عن القوات الاميركية الرسمية دون مسائلة، كما هو موثق في عدد من المصادر. (يعد كتاب الصحفي جريمي سكيهل حول بلاكووتر من اهم المراجع وافضلها توثيقا:  Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army, by Jeremy Scahill)

 

         وبهذه الخطوة الغير مسبوقة، ترمي الامارات الى توطين المرتزقة على اراضيها لتضعهم في خدمة الانظمة الخليجية الاخرى لحمايتها من هبات جماهيرية لا محالة، من ناحية، وتوظيف هذا الرصيد المكتسب للتدخل في اي بقعة او منطقة في الاقليم تعترض على مخطط الهيمنة الاميركية الشاملة، من ناحية اخرى. ويبقى السؤال المركزي، من يملك قرار التحكم بمسرح عمليات واهداف المرتزقة؟

 

التوظيف التقليدي للمرتزقة:

 

         ابتلت القارة الافريقية في عقد الستينيات بتدخل عسكري وحشي قامت به وحدات كبيرة من الجنود المتقاعدين ومن جنسيات مختلفة نيابة عن بعض الدول الكبرى لشؤون التدريب والتدخل المباشر ضد انظمة وطنية، كما حصل في الكونغو عام 1966. وكانت السمة العامة للمرتزقة انها قوة تتحرك وفق قاعدة مجموعات صغيرة تمتلك خبرات قتالية عالية تؤدي مهام القوات الخاصة. ويذكر ان عملية توظيف المهنيين المهرة من المرتزقة هي عملية باهظة التكاليف، ويصل مرتب الفرد نحو 250،000 دولار سنويا بمقاييس اليوم.

 

         ومن الجانب القانوني  يحرم القانون الدولي استخدام المرتزقة في اعمال حربية، ويجيز قيامها بمهام تقليدية في التدريب والدعم اللوجستي، لكن مسالة السيادة الوطنية يتم التغاضي عنها. وفي بعض الحالات كان يسمح لشركات المرتزقة القيام باعمال التدريب بمعرفة ومباركة وزارة الخارجية المعنية.

 

 

Executive Summary

 

This is a major week in the course of American/Middle East relations with Obama delivering major Middle East speeches and holding meetings with Jordanian King Abdullah and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington this week.  Most of the think tank community looks at these events from different perspectives.

 

Early analysis of the speech, little has changed.  Obama offered more foreign aid to countries in the region, especially Egypt, which is suffering from a lack of tourists, in the wake of the demonstrations.  Loans and trade are promised to other countries in the region.

 

Obama also promised to push for a Palestinian/Israeli peace deal, but specifics to actually break the logjam were scarce.  He also took aim at Syria calling for Bachar Assad to lead the reform or facing isolation but stopping short of calling for regime change.

 

 


Obama Addresses the Middle East Again

Brief Comments by Prof. Michael Brenner:

 

Public declarations of statesman can convey belief and intention.  Often, one must strain to discern them as they are hedged by qualifications and contingent references.  At other times, the overriding purpose is obfuscation.  That becomes the goal when a leader temporizes, is indecisive and disinclined to make decisions on matters that entail risks and costs - be they diplomatic or domestic.    Such was the nature of Barack Obama's address on the Middle East last Thursday.   

 

Trying to discern in his remarks the contours of a coherent foreign policy is futile. For the elucidation of a strategic design was not the purpose.  Nor was the purpose to stake out a firm position that would be the pivot for future actions re. Palestine, reform movements in those countries where they are being repressed, or Iran.  The aim was political – in two senses.  The first, primary consideration was to create favorable impressions among the American public - especially the political class – of Obama’s stewardship and the country’s exalted standing in the world.  Israel's supporters above all.  The secondary objective, I believe, was to shape perceptions of the United States as a sober, responsible and ‘humane’ power whose leadership in the Middle East is indispensible.

Toward that end, Obama took a dual approach.  The first element was casting the discourse at a high level of abstraction: "our enduring values and principles," the imperative of economic development, the necessary reconciliation of stability with progressive change.  The pronouncement of American commitment to a 'two state' formula to resolve the Palestinian impasse was also abstract even if it had a specific referent.  Obama gave no indication of a readiness to alter the servile attitude of the United States toward the willful, unbending Israeli leadership.  Words about settlements ring hollow when there is no evident readiness to twist the Israelis’ arms or impose serious sanctions.  Reference to a renewed 'peace process' for the umpteenth time is meaningless when there is no plan to include Hamas or even favorable notation of its reconciliation with Fatah.  Similarly, a vague passing allusion to Bahrain carries no sign of a shift in priorities that until now has heavily favored reassuring the Gulf autocrats of America's continuing devotion to their partnership. 

The other element in Obama's address was stylistic.  Rather than formulate an integrated strategy that was politically and intellectually coherent, Obama chose to present a sort of collage or, perhaps more accurately, a modernistic painting a la Kandinsky.  That involved displaying on the canvas (the minds of his audience) arresting images in various shapes and splashes of color along with stray lines, vaguely connected to each other, that commented upon the bright passages.  All the components were chosen with care to evoke certain impressions and images.  Bows to the greatness of the Arab past; conjuring in vivid terms the spectre of endless war that must be exorcised; pious allusion to the Divine spark and our eternal longing to comport with our better angels; presenting America in its Sunday best – the virtuous power with the means and will to promote the enlightened interests of everyone in the Middle East. In short, America under the leadership of Barack Obama is the one best hope of Muslims, Jews and Christians alike. These unoriginal materials were speckled throughout the speech, suitably attired for the grand occasion.  They give tone and were meant to be felt as tokens of earnestness while creating a mood of uplift.

We have heard all of this before - in Cairo, at the Nobel ceremony in Oslo.  The overall composition, as well as its individual ingredients, is designed to play on feeling rather than to engage thought.  Certainly not critical cognition.  These are not dots, data points, encouraging you to connect them by your own applied intellect.  They are an invitation to see reality in the speaker’s terms without the audience’s sensing the artist’s guiding hand.  This is the way non-representational art works, when there is intelligent intent behind its creation. 

The tangible recognizable bits (Egypt, Tunisia, a visionary Israel/Palestine) are interspersed throughout not for the purpose of instruction.  Rather, they are intended to ensure that your thoughts/feelings about them should be made favorable by the composition of evocative symbols that surrounds them.  Oratory of this nature is meant to leave a lasting impression.  An impression of the person and his conduct whose afterglow will cast in a becoming light all else that will (or will not) emanate from him.  It burnishes his persona.  It is but a highlight in a campaign – a campaign to make of a virtual reality to which there is no commitment to make actual, seem genuine. 

This is vintage Obama.  He sets himself tests not of tangible accomplishment but of rhetorical creation.  Gratification comes from assembling the pieces so that seem to hang together- that they make the desired impression, that they punctuate the moment and shape political imagery in the future long enough, and with a deep enough impression, to fend off the critical judgments of initiatives that never come, of half-measures that are never completed, of goals that fade further into the horizon. 

This time, it will not work.  For those in the vanguard of Middle East reform, we have shown ourselves the well-wisher of democracy but the hand holder of autocracy.  We embrace freedom when it is cheap and easy.  We speak of self determination, but Palestinians are denied succor except for the stale words that catch in the throat.  We pronounce the desire to put the war on terror in perspective, yet we prosecute war unrelentingly in Afghanistan and elsewhere while clumsily intervening in the combustible affairs of Pakistan.  We paint pictures of a new era of cooperation, yet balk at even considering possible engagement of the Iranians on anything but our own terms.  We speak of regional harmony, while contributing directly and indirectly to a looming war of Armageddon between Sunnis and Shi’ites.

The past five months has seen events of historic importance: the upheavals of the Arab Spring whose repercussions continue to register; the Hamas-Fatah political reconciliation; and the Osama bin-Laden affair.  All of American strategy is challenged thereby, its premises undermined, its aims misaligned with new realities, its tactics losing viability, America's standing losing credibility.  Yet nothing in Washington's mentality changes.   That is confirmed by Obama’s high-minded and high sounding speech that uses the lexicon of change, of resetting, but instead leaves all the essentials in place. 


 

 

 

The Center for American Progress, which is very influential in the Obama Administration, makes it suggestions about American Policy in the Middle East.  They conclude, “But there are major opportunities in this transition. The greatest opportunity presented by the popular uprisings is to help key countries transition from the autocratic governments that permitted terrorist threats to fester alongside endemic poverty, weak governance, and corruption toward a more democratic system. The old way of doing business in the Middle East is no longer sustainable.  At this pivotal and historic juncture in the Middle East, the Obama administration should redouble its efforts to support the transition by adopting a more comprehensive reform package for Egypt, revive its longstanding but flagging efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and stay the course on Iran.  Moving more boldly—as President Obama did in his decision on the bin Laden raid—will lead to greater chances for progress and change in the region.”

 

The Heritage Foundation looks at the upcoming Obama speech on the Middle East and makes several suggestions.  They conclude, “Any new Middle East strategy announced by the President lacking these kinds of concrete commitments will fall far short of what is needed. Obama cannot build a plan for the future of U.S. engagement with the “new” Middle East based on what the White House has done the past two years—those efforts accomplished far too little and are far too inadequate to meet the new strategic realities of the region. The Administration’s engagement policy toward hostile dictatorships in Iran and Syria has failed, and the Administration now must engage with the people rather than their oppressors. The U.S. must show it is a reliable ally for democratic forces and cannot neglect them in a vain effort to reach questionable diplomatic agreements with the increasingly isolated Iranian and Syrian regimes.”

 

In light of Obama’s upcoming speech, the Wilson Center looks at the complex issues facing the US.  They recommend, “Obama should see what he can get from Netanyahu on the big issues like borders that he might shop with Abbas. The smart money is on keeping his powder dry for now; he'll need it to head off the next crisis this fall when the Palestinians go to the UN seeking a declaration of virtual statehood.”

 

The Brookings Institute looks at Obama’s choices in Arab Israeli negotiations.  They conclude, “It is easy to come up with excuses for why now is not the right moment, from internal Israeli politics to the Hamas-Fatah deal. But the truth is that any lasting deal will entail painful mutual compromises and no divided Palestinian leadership can sell such a deal to its public — certainly not in an environment of public uprisings. And Israelis would do well to repeat what they had done in times of crisis: forge their own national unity government in preparation for serious negotiations. But only Washington can lead and its relations with a revolutionary Arab world will depend on it.”

 

The situation in Syria received attention from the Carnegie Endowment.  They note, “Israel and the United States, for their part, are uncertain about Syria’s future. They have no affinity for the Syrian government, which has opposed Israeli occupation and U.S. policy in the region for years. But they also fear an Islamist turn in Syria if the current regime collapses. But the U.S. administration is taking a much harder position as bloodshed continues. In sum, it is clear that Syria’s handling of the crisis so far has cost the country dearly in terms of loss of life, injury, and internal stability and prosperity. It has also damaged Syria’s regional and international relations.  The best-case scenario would be for the president to accept the need for rapid and fundamental reform, and be able to move ahead in implementing many of the reforms enunciated by the National Initiative for Change. But this appears increasingly unlikely. The worst-case scenario is that the situation in Syria spirals downward into the abyss of civil war. One can only hope that Syria finds a way to overcome this dangerous stalemate. 

 

The Washington Institute also addressed Syria, and unlike the Carnegie Endowment think Assad must go. They argue, “The key to change lies in the clarity of the message broadcast to Syria. The men around Asad, the officers commanding the army, the Sunni merchant class, and the courageous protestors all need to know that the best choice is that "Asad should go." And international support for taking a chance on the "devil we don't know" will help empower Syrians to make that change.”

 

The Heritage Foundation warns against any pressure to withdraw from Afghanistan now that Bin Laden is dead.  They warn, “Bin Laden’s death may signal a turning point in the fight against terrorism. But to use it as an excuse for rapidly withdrawing troops from Afghanistan is shortsighted and would likely spell disaster for the region, where a plethora of Islamist extremist groups threaten stability in both Afghanistan and nuclear-armed Pakistan.  Any arbitrary U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan would open the door for the Taliban to regain influence in the region and allow al-Qaeda and its affiliate organizations to regroup and revitalize. The U.S. instead needs to press its advantage in Afghanistan and demonstrate that it is committed to helping ensure long-term stability in the region.”

 

 

ANALYSIS

 

Mercenaries and the Middle East

 

Despite the wars that have raged across the region, the Middle East has remained relatively free of mercenary experience until the US invasion of Iraq, even though many GCC countries has employed a large contingencies of foreign army units in their Armed forces, and just hundreds of kilometers to the south in Sub-Saharan Africa, mercenaries have been common for half a century. There have been reports in Libya that Gaddafi has been hiring ex-soldiers from western Africa, to fight the rebels.

 

But, the biggest story recently is the one coming out of the UAE, where there are reports that the nation’s leadership has hired an American to build a battalion of mercenaries for the Sheikdom.

 

 Mercenaries have received a bad reputation – primarily from the behavior of several units used in the post colonial wars in Africa, the modern breed is often more professional and in great demand throughout the world. The United States has been the biggest employer of them in recent history and these mercenaries have generally been former US Special Forces soldiers who are now civilians.  Private companies also hire these “security services” to protect remote operations in politically unstable parts of the world.  Even the United Nations hired the South African mercenary company Executive Outcomes to handle logistical support in Africa. Mercenaries also assisted the UN during the 1960s.

 

However, the use of mercenaries in UAE has tended to move away from the traditional use of mercenaries in recent history.  We will look at how they are being used, how effective their use is, and the future of mercenaries in the region.

 

Traditional employment of mercenaries

 

Although the post colonial wars in Africa in the 1960s used large units of ex-soldiers (usually with experience in WW II, Korea, or French Indochina), the traditional use of mercenaries in the last half century has been limited to hiring small groups of highly trained ex-soldiers (often from special or elite units) for training, to lead native soldiers, or for special operations. 

 

There are three reasons for limiting the size of mercenary forces.  First, good professionals are expensive and represented a drain on hard currency reserves (today’s highly trained former Special Forces mercenary can cost over $250,000 a year).  Second, too large a group of mercenaries could carry out a rebellion as they did in the Congo in the 1960s.  Finally, the existing pool of highly trained professionals is quite limited.  Any attempt to expand a mercenary force too much risks the hiring of ex-soldiers who are more killers than soldiers.

 

Since international law bans the use of mercenaries in actual combat, the traditional use of mercenaries is in training and logistical support.  In many cases, the mercenary companies have been allowed to provide training with the approval of their own foreign office.

 

Mercenaries in the Middle East

 

Mercenary units are of necessity isolated from the population – both by nationality and the fact that they are used in repression.  Although they have a monetary loyalty to the regime, that will disappear if payment is not forthcoming.

 

As was seen in the Congo in the 1960s, such units are unreliable allies.  In 1966, amid rumors that the ousted Congolese prime minister Tshombe was plotting a comeback from his exile in Spain, some 2,000 of Tshombe's former Katangan gendarmes, led by mercenaries, mutinied in Kisangani (formerly Stanleyville) in July 1966. The mutiny was unsuccessful and was crushed.

 

Exactly a year after the failure of the first mutiny, another broke out, again in Kisangani, apparently triggered by the news that Tshombe's airplane had been hijacked over the Mediterranean and forced to land in Algiers, where he was held prisoner. Led by a Belgian settler named Jean Schramme and involving approximately 100 former Katangan gendarmes and about 1,000 Katangese, the mutineers held their ground against the 32,000-man Congolese National Army until November 1967, when Schramme and his mercenaries crossed the border into Rwanda and surrendered to the local authorities.

 

As is seen in this case, mercenaries can change allegiance if circumstances change and even support an overthrow of the current leadership.  Since they have no allegiance to the population, they are more likely to participate in massacres and destruction of the infrastructure.

 

The same situation also exists with the battalion of mercenaries in the UAE.  However, there are also different circumstances.

 

In many cases, the UAE employed its mercenaries in traditional roles.  Erick Prince, who founded Blackwater, brought in American, German, British, French, and South African professionals to handle the logistics and training missions.  This is the traditional force multiplier role that is useful for a small nation like the UAE.

 

The problem was in trying to create a mercenary battalion that would be used for security, countering terrorist attacks, special operations, and suppressing internal revolts by the large foreign national workforce.

 

As was mentioned earlier, the pool of potential skilled, professional ex-soldiers is quite limited because of the time it takes to train one.  Countries like the US or UK usually train a recruit a year before he is considered qualified to go into a combat situation.  They will also regularly undergo additional training during the term of their enlistment.  In the case of Special Forces soldiers, the training takes years and costs several million dollars per person.  As a result, highly trained, motivated soldiers capable of becoming a mercenary are rare because they frequently become career soldiers and don’t even become available for recruiting until they are in their 40s.

 

Although the UAE’s mercenary battalion leadership was highly qualified, the average recruits were less qualified than hoped.  Most of the recruits were hired from South American nations like Columbia.  The recruits were to have had either prior military or police experience. 

 

However, the UAE learned the average recruit had neither the skills, background, nor physical conditioning necessary for the missions expected of the force.  Many of the trainees had little or no weapons experience, which necessitated additional training and took more time.  Many came from police backgrounds, which is entirely unsuited to carrying out special military operations.  And many of the recruits were middle aged and not physically capable to carry out the exhausting training or engaging in rigorous special operations.  There were also issues with drug use or unsuitability for a professional military organization.

 

The result is that producing this professional, highly trained, force fell far behind an overly optimistic schedule.  In addition, the planned battalion strength of 800 was reduced to 580 as the pool of qualified recruits was exhausted.

 

How well qualified the battalion is for its mission is questionable.  It can surely provide good security for pipelines and key buildings.  It can also provide a force that could control crowds of unarmed foreign workers.

 

However, the chance that it can carry out special operations in the UAE or elsewhere is highly questionable. Although they are currently expected to be an operational unit, they have only had about half the training that would be given to a US or UK recruits at the beginning of their enlistment.  Nor, is there any plan for the additional training that highly trained soldiers are given during the course of their career.  This is exacerbated by the age of the recruits.

 

One such envisioned special operation is the recapture of Abu Musa in the Strait of Hormuz.  However, satellite imagery shows that such an operation would be foolhardy.  Not only would the mercenary battalion be outnumbered, they would be fighting an Iranian force with armor.  Since the UAE doesn’t have the amphibious fleet to land sufficient armored support, the lightly armed mercenary force would be hard pressed to even gain a foothold in the island.

 

Recapturing a site taken by terrorists would be a more likely scenario.  However, potential targets like a building would be too small for the whole force.  In reality, the mercenary training staff would probably be more effective in carrying out the mission by themselves. Another contemplated scenario would be to use the mercenaries as a private security force by UAE leader against potential revolt by another leader in internal struggle over succession or against military coup by “free officers” revolting against the

ruling dynasty.

 

The bottom line is that the UAE mercenary battalion will provide much less security that the nation’s leadership hopes for.

 

 

PUBLICATIONS

 

 

After bin Laden: Top Five Agenda Items for Obama’s Middle East Speech

By James Carafano, James Phillips, Sally McNamara and Helle Dale

Heritage Foundation

May 16, 2011

Web Memo

 

Last week White House Press Secretary Jay Carney promised the President would soon make a major address “on the Middle East and U.S. policy in the Middle East...to a broader audience than just the Arab world.” It is long past time for President Barack Obama to lay out a plan for how his Administration will address the historic change sweeping this part of the world. By exercising energetic leadership now and continuing to engage in the right way in the months ahead, the President can protect U.S. interests and promote opportunities for liberty, security, and economic opportunity in the region. Making real progress with U.S. policy will require real change in Administration policies. There are five initiatives that should top the President’s agenda.

Read more

 

 

After bin Laden: Do Not Retreat from Afghanistan

By Lisa Curtis

Heritage Foundation

May 17, 2011

Web Memo

 

The killing of Osama bin Laden should strengthen U.S resolve to stabilize Afghanistan and ensure that it does not return to serving as a safe haven for terrorists intent on attacking the U.S. homeland. While the death of bin Laden marks a turning point in the fight against global terrorism, al-Qaeda and its affiliate organizations will not dissolve immediately.   U.S. troop withdrawals from Afghanistan beyond that which may be justified by conditions on the ground would squander the gain of eliminating bin Laden, who appears to have played a major role in directing attacks against the U.S. up until his death two weeks ago. Instead, the U.S. should build on bin Laden’s death to advance its Afghanistan strategy by seeking to convince the Taliban leadership to finally break ties to al-Qaeda and join a legitimate peace process in Afghanistan.

Read more

 

 

U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition

By Anthony Cordesman and Alexander Wilner

Center for Strategic and International Studies

May 17, 2011

Report

 

The Iranian government’s statements and actions provide considerable insight into the country’s strategic competition with the US. They help show how the regime perceives and responds to external pressure and its relationship with the international community. The regime’s rhetoric regarding its “soft war” against external cultural influence and domestic liberalism as well as laws such as the proposed Supervision of Members of Parliament bill provide key insights into the changing nature of the regime and its outlook.  For example, the Fars News Agency published an article on Dec. 21, 2010 that accused the US and the UK of hatching plots for “confronting Islamic values.” The article contained quotes from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and IRGC Commander General Mohammed Ali Jafari, both of which make explicit reference to “soft war” as a method to undermine the Islamic Republic.

Read more

 

 

The Crisis in Syria Shakes the Levant

Paul Salem

Carnegie Endowment

May 13, 2011

Commentary

 

After a period of calm in the first three months of the Arab Spring, protests in Syria have now entered their eighth week. Protests that started in Deraa spread to dozens of towns and cities, and,  although the uprising has not yet reached the scope of the Egyptian or Tunisian uprisings, it is proving more costly in human lives. Already over 850 people have been killed and thousands of others have been wounded. And there is still no indication that the opposition or the government will be able to resolve the situation in its favor anytime soon.  The regime initially appeared to be following the Algerian example of pursuing a combination of narrow socio-economic concessions and promises of some reform on the one hand, and limited repression on the other. However, the overreaction of local security officials in Deraa to what was initially a minor infraction by local youths led to a popular uprising there; and events in Deraa then led to sympathetic protests around the country.

Read more

 

 

Obama and the Middle East: It Will Be Tough to Turn the Page

By Aaron Miller

Wilson Center

May 16, 2011

 

This week, President Obama is looking to turn a new page in the Middle East with his speech and meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. But an increasingly frosty Arab spring and a profound impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process won't let him. Bin Laden may be dead, but America's headaches in a still broken and dysfunctional region live on. Three months in, much of the Arab Spring has become winter. Tunisia and Egypt are hopeful, but elsewhere, things are grimmer. The ruling Khalifas in Bahrain, backed by the Saudis, have repressed the Shia opposition and community without much hope of offering real reform. In Yemen, the Gulf Cooperation Council-brokered deal to ease President Saleh from power seems to have collapsed. And in Syria, Assad kills his own people in the streets with impunity.

Read more

 

 

Syria: The Case for 'The Devil We Don't Know'

By Amos Yadlin and Robert Satloff

Washington Institute for Near East Policy

May 19, 2011

Policy Watch 1809

 

The Obama administration's announcement yesterday specifically sanctioning Syrian President Bashar al-Asad begins to clear the fog that has clouded policy toward this pivotal country since the outbreak of mass protests weeks ago. As U.S. and international leaders have grappled with popular uprisings across the Middle East, the tension between moral values and strategic interests has often complicated decision making, and until yesterday, this appears to have been the case with regard to Syria. But now that the administration has adopted a policy of "reform or go" -- i.e., calling on the Syrian president either to begin an improbable transformation of his family-led dictatorship into an accountable, rights-respecting democracy or step aside from his leadership of the country -- Washington may finally have shed its reluctance to adopt measures that could bring about the demise of the al-Asad regime. In other words, President Obama now at least entertains the idea that the "devil we don't know" in Syria -- an alternative to Asad -- is preferable to the one we do.

Read more

 

 

Obama's Arab-Israeli Options

By Shibley Telhami

Brookings Institute

May 18, 2011

 

As President Obama lays out his approach to the Middle East, he will need to be mindful of this prism for a newly empowered generation of Arabs seeking freedom and dignity. But there should be no doubt that the old prism of pain through which Arabs view the world, the Israeli-Palestinian will only be magnified in the months ahead. It cannot be avoided, and kicking the can forward is unlikely to make addressing this conflict any easier. While the Arab awakening is not about the Arab-Israeli conflict as such, it would be a mistake not to see that at the core of the demand for dignity are multiple issues including foreign policy. Even though the Arab-Israeli issue is not the top priority for most Arabs, Arab public opinion has been angrier with Israel than Arab governments.

Read more

 

 

Changing the Mindset on U.S. Policy in the Middle East

By Brian Katulis

Center for American Progress

May 18, 2011

 

This week represents a pivotal period that could define the Obama administration’s approach on the Middle East for the rest of its time in office, with President Barack Obama delivering major Middle East speeches and holding meetings with Jordanian King Abdullah and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington this week.  For the United States, a strategic choice is emerging about what role it seeks to play in the Middle East. Should it seek to manage the conflicts and reduce the risks of a broader conflagration? Or should it adopt a more proactive approach to shape the broader trends in the Middle East at a time of unprecedented uncertainty in the region? Can it do both of these things at the same time and achieve tangible results?

Read more

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